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Introduction  
While a state may permissibly proscribe physician assisted suicide, some states have 
gone further and prohibited speech encouraging suicide.
1
 Such legislation not only offends the 
First Amendment, but also potentially sanctions physicians for discussing end of life treatment 
plans, which could inevitably threaten the doctor-patient relationship.
2
  The Supreme Court has 
taken on several notable cases regarding end of life decision making; however, the Court has yet 
to rule on whether any states’ statute prohibiting speech encouraging suicide violates the First 
Amendment.
3
  
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 619.215; O.C.G.A. § 15-5-5(b). See also, Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a Washington statute that made it a felony to knowingly cause or aid another 
person to attempt suicide). 
2
 Infra, Part II, Section B. 
3
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1990) (holding that  a 
state has a right to require clear and convincing evidence  of an incompetent person’s desire to refuse life sustaining 
treatment in order for life support to be removed).   
2 
 
  This paper will discuss three cases involving First Amendment challenges to state 
statutes criminalizing the promotion or advertising of suicide.  While the statutes at issue target 
suicide generally, this paper will focus on the statutes as they relate to patient-physician 
communication.  Part I will provide history on the treatment of suicide and assisted suicide in the 
United States.  Part II will discuss informed consent and practices that hasten death.  Part III will 
provide the framework for how the Supreme Court analyzes a First Amendment challenge.  Part 
IV will discuss three recent cases that have challenged the constitutionality of statutes abridging 
speech encouraging suicide. Part V will explain why the Melchert-Dinkel Court erred in 
upholding § 609.215 and why Final Exit Network (Minnesota) was correct in striking it down.  
Furthermore, it will explain that while Final Exit Network (Georgia) was correct in holding that 
the statute was underbroad.  Part VI will discuss how upholding § 609.215 and similar statutes 
could have a detrimental impact on informed consent and the doctor-patient relationship.  Part VI 
will also recommend a statutory framework that would balance the government’s compelling 
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide and protecting First Amendment rights 
necessary to foster adequate patient-physician dialogue during end of life treatment decisions. 
Part I: History Perspective and Trends in the Treatment of Suicide 
A. English Common Law Tradition  
Under English Common Law, suicide was a serious crime.
8
 The act of committing 
suicide motivated by anger was punished by forfeiting land and chattel to the King; if committed 
because of pain and suffering, only the deceased chattel was forfeited.
9
  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
8
See In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 433 (1983); Catherine Shaffer, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 348, 349 (1986). 
9
 Sue Wool Brenner, Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A proposed Analysis of the Criminal Offense of 
“Causing Suicide”, 57 ALB. L. REV. 62, 64 (1982). 
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deceased would not receive a funeral.
10
  Because suicide was a crime, encouraging suicide and 
conspiracy to commit suicide were crimes as well.
11
  An individual that encouraged suicide and 
was present was known as a “principal in the first degree”; if the adviser was not present he or 
she would be considered an “accessory before the fact”.12 
B. United States Tradition 
While several courts in early United States deemed suicide a criminal act, no court 
adopted the English common law punishments of forfeiture.
13
  Criminal acts in the United States 
are now set forth by statute.
14
  States have moved away from treating suicide as a criminal 
offense.
15
  There are several rationales for the United States’ treatment of suicide.16  One 
justification is that the individual that committed suicide could not be penalized; forfeiture of 
wealth and ignominious burial would only serve as a punishment to the innocent family of the 
deceased.
17
  Another justification is that suicide was seen as an act by the mentally ill; therefore, 
medical treatment, not culpability, was warranted.
18
   Many states do, however, criminalize 
assisting one in suicide.
19
  Twenty-two states criminalize assisted suicide by statute as a separate 
                                                 
10
 Id. 
11
 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, 188-89. 
12
 See, Shaffer, supra note 8, at 348. 
13
Id.  
14
Id. 
15
 See Id. 
16
 See Leslie L. Mangini, To Help or Not to Help: Assisted Suicide and its Moral, Ethical and Legal Ramifications, 
18 SETON HALL LEG. J. 728, 734. 
17
 Id. 
18
Id. 
19 See Ala. Code § 22-8A-10 (1997); Alaska Stat. § 11.41.120 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1103 (2001 & 
Supp. 2006); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-106; Cal. Penal Code § 401(West 1999 & Supp. 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
18-3-104 (West 2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-56 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006; Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 645 (2001); 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.08 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-5 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 327E-
13 (2000); Idaho Code Ann. § 56-56-1022 (2002); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5-12-31 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); 
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-2.5 (2004); Iowa Code Ann. §707A.2 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3406 (1995 & Supp. 
2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 216.302 (1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.12 (1997 & Supp. 2006); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. It. 17-A, § 204 (2006); Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 3-102 (2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.329a 
(2004); Minn. Stat. ann. § 609.215 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-49 (West 2005 & Supp. 
2005); Mo. Ann. Stat § 565.023 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-105 (2005 & Supp. 2006); 
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offense or a type of murder or manslaughter.
20
  The model penal code states that criminal 
homicide is the appropriate charge if “a person purposely causes suicide by force, duress or 
deception.”21  Aiding or soliciting another to commit suicide is a second degree felony under the 
model penal code if a suicide or attempted suicide occurs.
22
   
The Supreme Court has held that the government has a compelling interest in preserving 
life and preventing suicide, which outweighs and individual’s desire to take one’s own life.27  
This means that states are permitted to create laws prohibiting suicide, and in turn assisted 
suicide.
28
  Currently, physician-assisted suicide is illegal in Forty-Six states and the District of 
Columbia.
29
  Four states have legalized physician-assisted suicide.
30
  The first state to legalize 
the practice was Oregon, in 1994, followed by Washington in 2008, Montana in 2009, and most 
recently, Vermont in 2013.
31
  The legalization of assisted suicide is also being considered in New 
Jersey, Kansas and Hawaii, while a similar bill in Connecticut was narrowly defeated.
32
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-412 (1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:4 (2001); N.J. Stat. An. § 2C:11-6 (2005); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 30-2-4 (2004); N.Y. Penal Law § 120.30 (McKinney 2004  Supp. 2006); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-16-05 
(1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3795.02 (2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 21 § 814 (2002); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann § 
2505 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-60-3 (2002); S.C. Code. Ann. § 16-3-1090 (2003); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 22-16-37 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-216(b)(2)(2003 & Supp. 2005); Tex. Penal Code. Ann. 
§ 22.08 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2a-122 (1993 & Supp. 2007); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
622.1 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.060 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-30-2 (2006); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.12 (West 2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-22-414 (2005). 
20
 Id. 
21
 Model Penal Code § 210.5(1). 
22
 Id.  
27
 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729. 
28
 See generally id.  
29
EUTHANASIA, Euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).  
30
 See ORS § 127.815; 18 V.S.A. chapter 113; Baxter v. Montana, P.3d 2009 WL 5155363 (Mont. 2009) (holding 
that a competent patient has a right to "use the assistance of his physician to obtain a prescription for a lethal dose of 
medication that the patient may take on his own if and when he decides to terminate his life" under Article II of the 
Montana Constitution). 
31
 See id. 
32
 2012 Bill Tracking NJ A.B. 3328. 
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Lay people are generally in favor of physician assisted suicide under at least some 
circumstances.
33
  In 2005, a Harris Poll showed that 70 percent of adults in the United States 
supported physician assisted suicide laws.
34
 In another poll, when Americans were asked “When 
a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to 
end the patient’s life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?” seventy-
one percent stated “yes.”35  This is a thirty-four percent increase in an affirmative answer since 
1947.
36
 
The medical community is split on the issue of physician assisted suicide.
37
  Many adhere 
to the view that physicians should not engage in assisted suicide because it violates their 
obligations under the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm.
38
  Those opposed to physician assisted 
suicide are also concerned about the harm to the doctor-patient relationship; however, empirical 
evidence has indicated that this concern is without merit.
39
  Supporters of physician assisted 
suicide stress patient autonomy.
40
   
Part II: Treatment Decisions and Hastening Death 
A. Informed Consent 
                                                 
33
 SIDNEY H. WANZER, M.D. & JOSEPH GLENMULLEN, M.D., TO DIE WELL 91 (Da Capo Press, 2007). 
34
 Id.  
35
Public Divide Over Moral Acceptability of Doctor Assisted Suicide, GALLUP (May 31, 2007) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27727/public-divided-over-moral-acceptability-doctorassisted-suicide.aspx; (It is 
important to note that the result was only fifty-eight percent yes when respondents were asked the question the 
following way "When a person has a disease that cannot be cured and is living in severe pain, do you think doctors 
should or should not be allowed by law to assist the patient to commit suicide if the patient requests it?"). 
36
 Id. 
37
See, Steven Reinberg, Most Doctors Oppose Physician Assisted Suicide, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 13, 
2013) http://health.usnews.com/health-news/news/articles/2013/09/11/most-doctors-oppose-physician-assisted-
suicide-poll-finds. 
38
 Id. 
39
ALAN B. ASTROW, M.D., FACING DEATH, WHERE CULTURE, RELIGION AND MEDICINE MEET 45-48 (Howard M. 
Spiro, et al, eds., Yale Univ. Press 2006).  
40
Reinberg supra, note 37.  
6 
 
Informed consent is a patient’s agreement to a course of treatment after having been 
informed of benefits, risks and alternatives.
45
  There are several justifications for informed 
consent.
46
  The patient-centered beneficence justification rests on the Hippocratic Oath and the 
belief that obtaining consent is to benefit the patient.
47
  For example, a physician might be 
unaware of patient-specific issues that could come to light upon discussing the side-effects of a 
particular drug.
48
  Informed consent is also justified on basis of bolstering societal trust of 
physicians and hospitals.
49
  The Autonomy justification rests on the principle that a patient has a 
right to make his or her own choices.
50
  While these justifications complement each other in 
substantiating the need for informed consent, recent trends toward more patient-centered 
approaches indicates that autonomy is the most prevalent rationale.
51
     
One challenge in determining the parameters of informed consent is how much 
information a patient should be given.
52
  The majority of jurisdictions follow a “reasonable 
practitioner” approach, which requires disclosure of information that a practitioner would make 
in similar situation.
53
 Recently, however, courts have required a more patient-centered approach, 
as opposed to a “reasonable practitioner” standard.54 The subjective approach requires a patient 
be given “enough information to exercise self-determination”.55  The subjective standard poses a 
challenge for physicians in that they must make very individualized determinations on what 
                                                 
45
See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 902-903 (1994). 
46
 ROBERT M. VEATCH, PATIENT PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP, THE PATIENT AS PARTNER, PART 2 83-85 (David H. 
Smith & Robert M. Veatch, eds., 1991). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 See Veatch, supra note 46 at 83. 
53
See Id. at 83; See also Bernard Barber, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY, AND RESEARCH 39 (Rutgers 
Univ. Press ed., 1980). 
54
 See Veatch, supra note 46 at 83. 
55
 Id. at 84. 
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information to disclose, as it is infeasible to disclose all information to a patient.
56
  A “reasonable 
patient” standard requires a physician to disclose information by determining what a reasonable 
person in that patient’s situation would want disclosed.57  While there is a risk that a patient will 
not receive some information that he or she might consider relevant, it still requires the physician 
to make a more individualized determination than the “reasonable practitioner” approach.58 
B. End of Life Treatment 
The role of physicians has transformed from the role of strictly a healer, to the alleviator 
of suffering and pain.
59
  Communication between physician and patients is crucial, and required 
under the doctrine of informed consent; however, a physician’s obligation is even more 
pervasive in the context of end of life treatment.
60
  When engaging in end of life treatment 
discussions with a patient, first, the physician should seek to gain insight into the patient’s 
“domain of personhood.”61  This includes learning about the patient’s personality, character, 
family, culture and other information relevant to his or her personhood.
62
  The physician should 
also seek to understand the nature of disease as well as what impact the disease is having on the 
individual patient, for example, the threat to integrity that a patient perceive if they are no longer 
able to feed him or herself.
63
  The physician should also establish realistic goals based on the 
individual’s priority.64  There are several measures a physician could theoretically take part in 
                                                 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. at 85. 
59
See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997) (noting that physicians’ role in withholding medical treatment and 
other life-hastening methods is evidence that doctors’ role has expanded from that of solely a “healer”).  
60
 Supra Part II, A; BALFOUR M. MOUNT, PALLIATIVE MEDICINE, A CASE BASED MANUAL 228 (Neil MacDonald, 
ed., 1999). 
61
 Supra Mount, note 60. 
62
 Id. at 228. 
63
Id. at 228. 
64
 Id. at 229. 
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that would result in ending the patient’s life, euthanasia, physician assisted suicide and the 
“double effect” of morphine, coupled with refusal of hydration and nutrition. 
  Euthanasia, the most controversial method, is generally understood as “the deliberate 
termination of another’s life at his request”.74  Euthanasia requires the physician to engage in an 
overt act that ends the patient’s life, such injecting a legal substance into the patient.75  In the 
United States, euthanasia is generally not considered an acceptable means for a physician to treat 
a terminally ill patient.
76
 
Physician assisted suicide involves a physician prescribing a drug or other substance for 
the purpose of assisting the patient in committing suicide.
77
  This method, while still very 
controversial, is currently legal in three states and on law maker’s radars in many others.78  It 
differs from euthanasia in that physician assisted suicide, unlike euthanasia, does not require the 
physician to engage in a positive act.  
A physician may employ the principle of “double effect” in the context of terminal 
sedation.  Double effect, here, involves treating symptoms of the patient’s illness by a means that 
also brings about unconsciousness.
79
  In order for the principle of “double effect” to apply, the 
unconsciousness must be an unintended consequence, even if unconsciousness is foreseen.
80
  The 
crucial difference between this practice and physician assisted suicide or euthanasia is the 
                                                 
74
 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (U.S. 1997). 
75
George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: Releasing an Unbearable 
Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  469, 512-13 (2006). 
76
 Wanzer, supra note 43, at 91. 
77 Id. at 91. 
78
 Susan Haigh, Assisted Suicide on legal Agenda in Several States, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 8, 2013) 
(http://www.foxnews.com/health/2013/02/08/assisted-suicide-on-legal-agenda-in-several-states/). 
79
LYNN A. JANSEN, RN, PHD & DANIEL P. SULMASY, OFM, M.D., PHD, Sedation, Alimentation, Hydration and 
Equivocation: Careful Conversation About Care at the End of Life, 136 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 845, 845 
(2002).  
80
 Id. 
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physician’s intent.81  While some physicians oppose the practice on the grounds that it is 
disguised euthanasia, the practice is generally considered legal throughout the United States.
82
 
“Double effect”, in this context, is no different from any other drug side effect.83  So long as the 
patient is aware of the potential side effects, this practice is ethically and legally sound.
84
   
In order for terminal sedation to result in death, a patient must utilize his or her autonomy 
in the refusal of hydration and nutrition.
85
  This involves a patient whose appetite, digestion or 
absorption of water and nutrients has not been directly affected by the patient’s illness, and the 
patient chooses to refuse nutrition.
86
 
Part III: First Amendment Analytical Framework 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prevents the government from 
interfering in one’s freedom of expression.91  This right to free speech, however, is not absolute.  
In the United States v. Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court set forth several categorical exceptions to 
free speech: fighting words, obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement and speech incident to 
criminal conduct.
92
  The Supreme Court has adopted category-specific analyses for determining 
what speech falls into the aforementioned categories.
93
  The Supreme Court has emphatically 
                                                 
81
 Id.; Wanzer supra, note 33 at 91.  
82
 Wanzer supra, note 33 at 91; Jansen supra,  note 79, at 845.  
83
 Wanzer supra, note 33 at 93-94.  
84
Id.; Veatch supra, note 46 at 83-84.  
85
 Jansen supra, note 79 at 845. 
86
 Id. 
91
 U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech…).  
92
 Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 US. 568, 572 (1942)  (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words -- 
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.  It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”). 
93
 See generally, Cohen v. California ,403 U.S. 15 (1971) (requiring that in order for speech to be deemed “fighting 
words”, unprotected by the First Amendment, the words must be directed at a person, tend to invite immediate 
breach of the peace, be highly offensive and a captive audience); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
10 
 
rejected the premise that new categories of speech could be created by balancing the value of a 
category of speech against its social good.
94
  The Court has acknowledged, however, that there 
may be categories of unprotected speech that have not yet been enumerated.
95
  In order to create 
a category of unprotected speech there must be persuasive evidence of “a tradition of 
proscription.”96     
A. Incitement to Criminal Activity 
 The relevant exception to speech encouraging suicide is incitement to criminal activity.
97
  
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for violating a syndicalism 
statute, holding that a state may only proscribe advocacy of violating the law where “such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”98 
B. Regulation of Protected Speech 
 Even if the speech the government is attempting to regulate does not fall into the 
enumerated categories of unprotected speech, it may still be permissibly regulated.
102
  Whether 
the government may regulate speech, and the level of judicial scrutiny to which such regulation 
will be put is determined by whether the regulation is content- based or neutral.  Content-based 
regulations target the substantive meaning of the speech and are subject to strict scrutiny.  There 
                                                                                                                                                             
(requiring that in order for speech to be categorized as “incitement” there must be a risk of imminent lawless action,  
the speaker must have the intent to incite lawless action and intent for the lawless action to occur immediately); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (requiring that in order for speech to be deemed “obscene” it must be 
determined that a reasonable person would determine that the work appeals to the prurient interest, the work depicts 
or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and the work lacks literary, artistic or political scientific 
value). 
94
 Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (U.S. 2011). 
95
 Id.  
96
 Id. 
97
 See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 816 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. App. 2012); State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., No. A13-
0563 (Minn. App. 2013) (examining whether the “incitement to criminal activity” exception applies to speech 
encouraging criminal activity). 
98
 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
102
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,  505 U.S. 377, 385-386 (1992). 
11 
 
are four types of content based regulations: viewpoint restriction, subject matter restriction, 
speaker-based restriction, and restrictions that are targeted at the communicative impact of the 
listener.
103
  Content-neutral regulations are those that only incidentally burden speech.
104
  
Content-neutral regulations include laws that restrict the time, place and manner of speech and 
laws that target the secondary effect of communication without regard to the communicative 
impact.
105
   
If a regulation is content based, the Court will apply strict scrutiny.
106
  If the regulation is 
content neutral, but incidentally burdens free speech, the court will first determine whether the 
regulation relates to a legitimate government interest.
107
  If so, a reviewing court will apply 
intermediate scrutiny.
108
  If the regulation is unrelated to furthering a legitimate governmental 
interest, the court will engage in strict scrutiny review.
109
   
i. Strict Scrutiny 
The Constitution prohibits the government from restricting expression because of the 
ideas espoused.
110
  Therefore, when the government seeks to make a restriction based on content, 
strict scrutiny must be satisfied.
111
  The first prong of the strict scrutiny standard is a compelling 
governmental interest.
112
  The stronger the government interest is, the more likely it is that the 
                                                 
103
Id. 
104
Id. 
105
Id. 
106
 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
107
 Id. 
108
Id. 
109
Id. 
110
Id. 
111
Id.  
112O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
12 
 
statute will be upheld.
113
  The second prong of the strict scrutiny standard is that the law be 
narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.114 
When analyzing a content-based restriction in speech, the government’s purpose is often 
the controlling factor.
115
  Even if speech may be constitutionally regulated by the government, it 
must be narrowly tailored to the government’s purported interest.120  Otherwise constitutional 
statutes will not satisfy strict scrutiny if it is underbroad or overbroad.
121
  These doctrines focus 
on the scope of government regulation after the category of regulation has been determined.
123
  
While the law may be valid as to some of the speech covered by the statute that has been 
determined to be unprotected, this doctrine could deem the law facially invalid.
124
     
A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if in the effort to punish speech that is not 
constitutionally protected, protected speech is restricted as well.
125
 Such a statute will be 
invalidated if it prohibits a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment.
126
  
The overbreadth doctrine has been called a “strong medicine”, and infrequently used to strike 
down a government regulation.
127
  This doctrine serves as a restraint on the government’s 
regulatory power by precluding a law from suppressing a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected speech.
129
   
                                                 
113
Id. 
114
Id.  
115
 4C M.J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 78. 
120
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385. 
121
Id. 
123
 Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 39. 
124
 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 S. Ct. (2008). 
125
Id. 
126
 Id. 
127
Id. 
129
 Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 214-15 (1975) (holding that a law prohibiting nudity in drive-in 
movie theaters was not permissible as a traffic regulation because it was no more distracting than other unrestricted 
types of films the drive in movie theater might play). 
13 
 
A statute is underbroad if it targets only some speech that furthers a legitimate 
governmental interest.
135
  Underbreadth occurs when a statute is too specific, regulating certain 
speech encompassed by the purported government interest, but not other speech hindering the 
government interest.
136
   
Part IV: Challenges to Laws Against Promoting and Advertising Assisted Suicide 
 Several cases have challenged the constitutionality of laws seeking to prohibit speech that 
encourages suicide.
143
  It is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in 
preserving life.
144
  The statutes at issue in the following cases have been challenged on the basis 
of whether or not the speech in question is protected, and whether the government has narrowly 
tailored the statute to meet its compelling interest in suicide prevention and preserving human 
life.
145
  
The statute at issue in Minnesota v. Final Exit Network Inc. (Final Exit Network 
(Minnesota)) and State v. Melchert-Dinkel was Minnesota statute § 609.215.  In relevant part, 
subdivision one criminalizes “whoever intentionally advises or encourages, or assists another in 
taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to 
payment of a fine of not more than $ 30,000, or both.”146  The statute at issue in Final Exit 
Network, Inc. v. State of Georgia was OCGA § 15-5-5(b), in relevant part, states that one “who 
publicly advertises, offers, or holds him-self or herself out as offering that he or she will 
                                                 
135
Id.  
136
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402 (A government regulation was invalidated under the doctrine of underbreadth because the 
government purported interest was in keeping the peace.  The statute, however, was limited to fighting words 
regarding race, color, creed or religion.  The Court reasoned that if the government’s interest was keeping public 
peace all fighting words would be banned, not just certain categories of fighting words.  Similarly, a state cannot ban 
speech advertising suicide.). 
143
 Melchert-Dinkel, 816 N.W.2d; Final Exit Network, A13-0563; Final Exit Network, 722 S.E.2dv722. 
144
Id. (The government conceded this point in all three cases.).  
145
Melchert-Dinkel, 816 N.W.2d; Final Exit Network, A13-0563. 
146
 Minn. Stat. §609.215. 
14 
 
intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and commits any 
overt act to further that purpose is guilty of a felony.”147  The statutes at issue are similar, in that 
they are both targeting, and criminalizing certain types of communication about suicide.
148
 The 
Georgia statute differs from the Minnesota statute in that the former proscribes one from 
advertising that he or she will assist in a suicide, while the latter disallows actual discussion 
between individuals that is deemed “encouragement” of suicide.149  
A. State of Minnesota v. Final Exit Network 
 Minnesota v. Final Exit Network involved the criminal prosecution of Final Exist 
Network (FEN), a non-profit corporation that provided “exit-guide” services and other end of life 
counseling services, Lawrence Egbert, a FEN medical director and Roberta Massey, a FEN case 
coordinator.
150
  FEN, Egbert and Massey were charged with advising, encouraging or assisting 
another in committing suicide, among other offenses related to FEN’s services.151       
To become a member of FEN an individual must fill out a short form and send a 
payment.
152
  FEN provides free exit-guide services to qualifying members.
153
  In order to qualify 
for exit-guide services, the individual seeking membership must have a phone interview with a 
“first responder” in order for FEN to gain information about his or her medical condition, family 
history and reasons for the desire to hasten death.
154
  The first responder also requests a letter 
from the member reiterating the facts discussed during the interview.
155
  The first responder’s 
                                                 
147
 § 15-5-5 (b). 
148
 Id; § 609.219. 
149
 § 15-5-5 (b). 
150
Final Exit Network, A13-0563 at 3. 
151
Id. at 2. 
152
JOIN OR RENEW FINAL EXIT NETWORK MEMBERSHIP,  https://donatenow.networkforgood.org/1438731 (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2013). 
153
 Id. 
154
Final Exit Network, A13-0563 at 3. 
155
Id.  
15 
 
notes and the letter from the member are reviewed by FEN’s medical director, who then 
determines whether the member qualifies for exit-guide services.
156
  Upon approval, the member 
is instructed on the instruments that must be purchased in order to facilitate the helium 
asphyxiation, the recommended method of suicide.
157
  The member is told to purchase specific 
helium tanks, a plastic hood and plastic tubing.
158
   Members receiving exit-guidance must be 
capable of physically performing all of the tasks necessary to facilitate his or her suicide. The 
only physical contact an exit-guide has with the member is holding his or her hand to provide 
moral support as well as prevent the plastic hood used from being inadvertently removed by the 
member due to involuntary movements that might occur during the process.
159
 
This case arose from the death of a Fifty-seven year old woman named Doreen Dunn.
161
  
Dunn had been living with chronic pain for over ten years as a result of a multitude of medical 
conditions.
162
  Law enforcement eventually linked Dunn’s death to FEN, and in May 2012 a 
grand jury returned an indictment charging FEN medical director, Lawrence Egbert, with four 
counts relating to encouraging suicide under § 609.215.
163
  Roberta L. Massey, a FEN 
representative to whom Dunn faxed her personal letter and medical information to, was charged 
with three counts under the same statute.
164
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the provision of § 609.215 criminalizing 
“encouraging” and “advising” suicide was an infringement on protected speech, and was facially 
overbroad; therefore, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the charges.165   
The court refused to find that promoting suicide is akin to promoting speech integral to 
illicit conduct.  The court noted its reluctance to create a new category of unprotected speech, as 
well as its unwillingness to extend the categories that already exist to cover more types of 
speech.
166
  The Court emphasized that the specific content-defined speech must itself be 
traditionally proscribed.
167
  The Court noted that unlike actually assisting in a suicide, speech 
advising suicide is not traditionally proscribed.
168
  The Court emphasized that few states actually 
criminalize speech encouraging suicide; and furthermore, historically, when advising one about 
committing suicide was punishable, it was on the theory aiding and abetting what was, then, the 
criminal act of committing suicide.
169
  The Court rejected the government’s argument that speech 
encouraging suicide falls into a category of speech not covered by the First Amendment; 
therefore, the statute would have to satisfy strict scrutiny in order to be upheld.           
The Court held that the statute did not pass strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly 
tailored.
170
  It was uncontested that the government has a compelling interest in preserving 
human life.
171
  The court found based on a plain reading of the statute that the government 
intended to prevent “any and all expressions of support, guidance, planning or education to 
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people who want to end their own lives.”172  The statute did not define the terms “advise” or 
“encourage”; therefore, the Court looked to the dictionary definitions for guidance.  Based on the 
dictionary definitions, the Court read “encourage” to mean “inspire with hope, courage or 
confidence” and “advise” to mean “counsel, or inform.” 173  The court interpreted this to 
criminalize all expressions of support.  The Court was particularly concerned about the potential 
for even political discourse about “right to die” issues being criminalized.174  The Court noted 
that the state could achieve its goal of preventing suicide through less restrictive legislation.
175
   
The Court also rejected the government’s position that the statute could be given a 
limited construction to only punish the unprotected speech.
176
  The Court noted that here, the 
speech covered by the statute was all protected.
177
   The statute at issue criminalized a broad 
spectrum of speech about suicide; therefore, the court found that the statute was not narrowly 
tailored to the state’s asserted interest of preserving life. 
B. The State of Minnesota v. Melchert-Dinkel 
State v. Melchert-Dinkel involved the criminal prosecution of William Merchert-Dinkel 
for violating § 609.215.  This case involved the suicide of, Mark Dryborough, in 2005 and a \ 
Nadia Kajouji, in 2008.
179
  An investigation by Minnesota law enforcement revealed that shortly 
before both individuals committed suicide, they had engaged in conversation via email and 
messaging with the defendant.
180
  Melchert-Dinkel used several aliases on websites promoting 
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suicide as a personal right.
181
  He presented himself as a female emergency room nurse who 
purported “she” was suicidal as well.182  The communication between Melchert-Dinkel and 
Dryborough involved Melchert-Dinkel, under the guise of a woman named Li Dao, offering to 
postpone “her” own suicide until Dryborough was ready to, as well as asking if Dryborough had 
made any further attempts or had any thoughts on his suicide.
183
  Melchert-Dinkel communicated 
with Kajouji under the pseudonym “Cami”, where he engaged in several discussions with 
Kajouju about effective methods of committing suicide, as well as a desire to watch her hang 
herself.
184
 
The Court held that the statute at issue did not offend the First Amendment .
186
  The court 
held that the statute was prohibiting the encouragement of “proscribable” conduct and, therefore, 
was not protected by the First Amendment.
187
  The court noted that although committing suicide 
is not illegal, the lack of prohibition “does not reflect either a public policy approving suicide or 
tolerating assisting suicide.”188  Given Minnesota’s history of condemning suicide and explicit 
prohibition against physician assisted suicide the court found that speech encouraging suicide 
was akin to encouraging criminal conduct.
191
 Speech that encourages illicit conduct is not is not 
protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution; therefore, the Court held that the 
statute at issue did not implicate the First Amendment.
192
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Furthermore, the court found that even if the speech were protected, the government had 
a compelling interest, and the law was narrowly tailored.
194
  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
held that the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.
195
  The court found that speech that 
intentionally advises or encourages suicide is a narrow category of speech, and did not cover 
social and political speech about suicide.
196
  The court also rejected the defendant’s contention 
that the term “encourage” includes “supportive language that agrees with the other person’s 
decision to commit suicide.”197  The court relied on the Oxford English Dictionary definition of 
the word encourage, “a transitive verb commonly meaning to attempt to persuade or ‘to induce’ 
to do a particular thing.”198  The court recognized “encourage” could be used to describe any 
speech in support of suicide; however, found that the statute is still not overly broad because the 
other uses of encouragement are unprotected by the First Amendment.
199
  The court read the 
prohibition to only cover a small subset of pro-suicide speech, allowing for social and political 
communication on the matter. 
C. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. The State of Georgia 
In Final Exit Network, Inc. v. The State of Georgia, the statute at issue was Georgia 
statute O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b).
201
  The law provided “any person who publicly advertises, offers, 
or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she will intentionally and actively assist 
another person in the commission of suicide and commits any overt act to further that purpose is 
guilty of a felony.”202  This case also involved FEN, the nonprofit defendant at issue in Final Exit 
                                                 
194
Id. at 716. 
195
Id. 
196
Id. at 715. 
197
Id. at 715. 
198
Melchert-Dinkel, 816 N.W.2d at 715. 
199
Id. at 716. 
201
 Final Exit, 290 Ga. at 508. 
202
 § 16-5-5(b). 
20 
 
Network (Minnesota) as well as similar facts.  Here, however, the court found that the statute 
was not narrowly tailored, because it did not encompass other speech encouraging suicide that 
affects the government’s purported interest.203 
Part V: First Amendment Analysis of Laws Prohibiting the Promotion of Suicide 
In assessing the disparate treatments of the same statute, it is important to note the factual 
differences in the two scenarios.  The Final Exit (Minnesota) facts involve a scenario where the 
defendants were seeking to alleviate a patient’s suffering and provide a support system.216  
Melchert-Dinkel involves deceit and predatory communication with vulnerable people—the type 
of situation laws such as the one at issue are targeting.
217
  The conflicting outcomes in the two 
cases is indicative of the need to establish a law that appropriately addresses the government’s 
core concerns while adhering to the First Amendment.  Failure to do so could have consequences 
beyond the predatory actions.  Legislation broadly covering “encouraging suicide” could 
potentially stifle open and honest communications between physician and patient.
218
 
A. Incitement to Criminal Activity Exception 
The Final Exit Network (Minnesota) Court was correct in holding that speech 
encouraging or advising suicide was protected by the First Amendment because it did not fall 
into the incitement to criminal activity exception.  It is crucial to note that in Minnesota, suicide 
is no longer criminalized.
219
  Furthermore, the Final Exit Network (Minnesota) Court correctly 
held that the statute was not narrowly tailored.   
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The Melchert-Dinkel Court incorrectly held that speech encouraging suicide is 
unprotected by the First Amendment because it is akin to speech integral to criminal conduct. 
After acknowledging that suicide is not a crime in Minnesota, the Court erred in relying on the 
Glucksberg analysis to find that because suicide is not condoned, it is analogous to criminal 
conduct.  In the portion of the Glucksberg opinion applied by the Melchert-Dinkel Court, the 
Supreme Court was conducting a due process analysis.
220
  In a due process analysis, the Supreme 
Court examines “the Nation’s history, legal traditions and practices”.221 The Court must engage 
in a different analysis when addressing a First Amendment challenge.  It is presumed that speech 
is protected by the First Amendment unless it falls into one of the categories enumerated in 
Chaplinsky.   
The exception at issue in these statutes is incitement to criminal conduct.
222
  Even 
accepting the Melchert-Dinkel Court’s analytical frame work examining of the Nation’s history 
and legal traditions to determine whether such speech is “integral to criminal conduct”, its 
analysis fails. While only a minority of states, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide 
might demonstrate growing acceptance of the practice.  There is strong support for the 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide in several other states as well.
223
  This can be attributed, 
in part to the “baby boomer” generation.224  As this group continues to age, and face end of life 
issues, they are becoming more vocal about legalizing physician-assisted suicide.
225
  Assisted 
suicide is an issue on the rise in the United States.  While the practice has not achieved majority 
acceptance, the growing trend in raising awareness to the benefits of physician-assisted suicide 
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refutes the notion that the practice is akin to criminal activity.  Had suicide been statutorily 
criminalized, speech encouraging suicide would not be protected by the First Amendment.  In 
Minnesota, that is not the case; furthermore, the Melchert-Dinkel Court failed to cite any case 
law to support its assertion that conduct that it is generally disfavored may be akin criminal 
conduct absent statutory prohibition.
226
 
The Final Exit (Minnesota) Court correctly noted that the Court is reluctant to create new 
categories of unprotected speech.  The dictum in United States v. Stevens indicates that the Court 
will be reluctant to add to the list of unprotected speech enumerated in Chaplinsky.
227
  
Furthermore, if the Court were to add another category of unprotected speech there would have 
to be a showing that the category of speech itself has a history of being banned.
228
  As the 
Melchert-Dinkel Court noted, suicide itself has been punishable in United States’ history; 
however, no evidence has been put forth by the government that showing a history of punishing 
speech that encourages suicide.  
B. Strict Scrutiny 
It is undisputed that the government has an interest in preserving human life.
229
  The 
Supreme Court has also acknowledged that suicide in particular is a public health problem that is 
closely associated with depression and affects a vulnerable population; therefore, the government 
has an interest in studying this problem and protecting that particular group of vulnerable 
individuals.
230
  In Final Exit Network (Georgia), Final Exit Network (Minnesota) and Melchert-
Dinkel, the courts all correctly categorized the regulations as “content based”, and identified that 
                                                 
226
Melchert-Dinkel, 816 N.W.2d.  
227
 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (refusing to add animal cruelty to the categories of speech that 
are not protected by the First Amenmdnent.). 
228
 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (noting that unlike sexual material, there is no tradition of banning violent speech). 
229
 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282. 
230
Id. 
23 
 
the prevention of suicide was in fact a compelling interest.  The courts’ decision then turned on 
whether the restriction was narrowly tailored.
231
 
The first step in determining whether or not a statute is narrowly tailored is the text of the 
statute itself.
232
  Section 609.215 criminalizes “advising” or “encouraging” another in taking the 
other’s own life; however, neither term is statutorily defined.233  In Final Exit Network, “advise” 
was defined as to counsel or inform.  “Encourage” was defined as “to inspire with hope, courage 
or confidence”.  In Melchert-Dinkel, “encourage” was defined as “to induce” or “to stimulate by 
assistance.”234  The Court also accepted that “encourage” could also encompass supportive 
language.
235
  Despite this concession the Court did not find that the statute was overbroad for 
encompassing too much protected speech.
236
  The Court’s analysis, however, rested on its flawed 
holding that speech inducing suicide is not protected by the First Amendment.
237
  The Court 
posited that because other forms of the statute are not constitutionally protected, the statute 
would not be deemed overbroad because of some instances where the First Amendment might be 
offended.  
The Supreme Court of Georgia correctly held that a statute that prohibited publicly 
advertising assisted suicide was underbroad. There, the government’s asserted interest was in 
preserving human life.
238
 The statute only criminalized public advertisement of assisted suicide, 
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while not criminalizing other instances of promoting assisted suicide.
239
  The court indicated that 
the statute would have satisfied judicial scrutiny if it had been written to include all forms of 
promoting assisted suicide, public and private.
240
  The court correctly found that the law was not 
narrowly tailored to the state’s asserted interest; therefore, the statute was unconstitutional for 
underbreadth.  
VI: Recommendation 
The Melchert-Dinkel Court’s holding could have dire consequences for patients nearing 
the end of their lives discussing treatment options with their physicians.  Patient’s have a right to 
be informed of different treatment options by his or her physician.
241
  Furthermore, it has been 
suggested patient’s have a “right not to suffer” when death is imminent.242  While there is no set 
rubric for the amount of information a patient must receive, courts have required at a minimum, 
that a physician divulge the amount of information that other practitioners would give in the 
same situation.
243
  A higher standard applied by some courts would require the physician to 
divulge as much information as that particular patient would want to disclose.
244
  Under either 
standard, the statute at issue these cases pose a potential roadblock to the physician-patient 
relationship.   
While physician assisted suicide is still widely considered unethical by the medical 
community, other palliative care measures may be affected by similar statutes.  While Minnesota 
Statute § 609.215 removes liability from physician’s actually administering the treatment, the 
statute is unclear as to physician liability in engaging in discussions with the patient regarding 
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end of life treatment and options.  For example, the use of pain medication, such as morphine, 
that also has the effect of causing sedation is generally deemed an ethical treatment plan.
245
  A 
patient also has the right to utilize his or her autonomy by refusing hydration and nutrition.
246
   
This could be expressed after a patient is unconscious by way of an advance directive indicating 
the patient’s wishes.247  While a physician actually engaging in these treatments will not be 
criminally liable for assisting in suicide, these options may not be clearly recognized and 
understood by a patient; therefore, it is incumbent on the patient’s physician to inform the patient 
of the side effects of the morphine, as well as well as the patient’s wishes going forward.248  A 
physician engaging in such a conversation could run afoul of the statute, despite the exemption, 
because an open and honest discussion on the patient’s viable options might cross the line into a 
treatment “knowingly administered…to cause death.”249 
In order to protect physician’s from criminal liability for abiding by the Hippocratic Oath, 
and protecting patient autonomy, statutes aimed at preventing suicide and preserving life, 
especially among vulnerable populations, must be narrowly drafted to exclude discussion of 
treatment plans.  The statute cannot, however, be drafted too narrowly, or it will run the risk 
underbreadth.
250
   
Working off of the statute at issue in Final Exit Network (Minnesota) and Melchert-
Dinkel, an adequate statute could follow the Model Penal Code, and require that duress, undue 
influence or deceit be used in the “encouragement” of the taking of the other’s life.  The statute 
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could also expand the exemption for physicians to explicitly exclude end of life treatment plan 
discussions from culpability.  Incorporating these requirements would hold Melcher-Dinkel 
liable for predatorily contacting his victims and encouraging suicide, while removing liability 
from Final Exit Network for providing compassionate encouragement. Furthermore, this would 
remove the consequence of inhibiting open and honest discussion between patients and their 
physicians.   
Similar to the Statute in Final Exit (Georgia), the recommended statute could potentially 
be challenged for underbreadth, as it would be carving out on particular area of the government’s 
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide by only proscribing encouragement when done 
under duress, force or fraud.  The statute could likely withstand such a challenge if the 
government more specifically defines its compelling interest.  As alluded to in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, which solidified the government’s compelling interest in protecting life, the 
government is primarily concerned with protecting the lives of those that are most vulnerable.
251
  
Such a challenge can also be countered by pointing to Scalia’s dicta in the landmark 
underbreadth case, R.A.V., where he stated “When the basis for the content discrimination 
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no 
significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”252  Relying on this dictum, the 
government could argue that such a statute strikes at the very reason for prohibiting the 
encouragement of suicide.  
Conclusion 
 While a state may prohibit assisted suicide, the state may not disregard the First 
Amendment protections enumerated by the Constitution.  Speech encouraging suicide is not 
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categorically excluded from First Amendment protections.  Such speech also cannot be 
categorized as speech integral to criminal conduct.  While suicide was a crime under English 
common law, the United States trend has been not to criminalize the act.  Furthermore, speech 
encouraging suicide is not a traditionally proscribed act, unless it rises to the level of assisting in 
the suicide or suicide attempt.  
Speech encouraging suicide is not in a category excluded from First Amendment 
protections; therefore, the government must show that it has a compelling interest, and the law 
must but narrowly tailored to further that interest.  It is widely accepted that the government has 
a compelling interest in preserving life and protecting vulnerable populations.  In order for the 
government to constitutionally address this interest, laws should create culpability targeting 
predatory behaviors by requiring fraud, for example.  This will promote open and honest 
conversation between patients and their physicians while allowing culpability for predators and 
those that actually assist in suicide, in states where assisted-suicide is illegal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
